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Abstract
Conventional wisdom suggests that occupational class plays a limited role in 
explaining vote choice in Iceland. In this paper, we argue that the death of  class 
in Icelandic politics may be premature and that it still plays a role in structuring 
political preferences and party choice. While the importance of  the traditional 
class cleavage may have declined to the point of  irrelevance, we suggest that 
there is a new type of  class voting in Iceland, containing both a vertical and a 
horizontal component. Furthermore, we argue that the Great Recession played 
a critical role in increasing the strength of  class voting around this new class 
schema, both because of  the conflict around economic issues it generated, but 
also because of  its facilitation of  the formation and success of  new parties. We 
test our main hypotheses using multinomial logistic regression on data from 
the Icelandic National Election Study from 1999 to 2016 and apply a modified 
measure of  cleavage strength, which we refer to as “Full Kappa”. Our results 
suggest that class voting is alive and well in Iceland and that its strength has 
increased following the Great Recession.
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The Great Recession and 
new class voting in Iceland
Introduction
According to conventional wisdom, class voting is not an important aspect of  Ice landic 
politics. While studies suggest that it played an important role during the mid-20th cen-
tury, it is generally considered, at least implicitly, mostly irrelevant to contemporary poli-
tics (Harðarson 2004; Indriðason, Önnudóttir, Þórisdóttir, & Harðarson 2017; Önnu-
dóttir, Schmitt, & Harðarson 2017). Instead, current scholarship emphasizes the im-
portance of  specific issue positions and election-specific factors in determining voting 
behavior in the Icelandic case, with structural cleavages, on the whole, playing a limited 
role. In essence, voters are assumed to have moved into the Michigan funnel of  causality 
in their voting behavior (Campbell et al. 1960).
In this paper, we argue that the verdict on the death of  class voting in Iceland may 
be premature. Although the importance of  the traditional class cleavage may have de-
creased in recent decades, we suggest that occupational class still plays a latent role in 
structuring political preferences and party choice. Employing recent advances in the 
study of  class voting (Oesch 2006) and the effects of  occupational class on political be-
havior (Kitschelt & Rehm 2014), we hypothesize that there is both a vertical component 
to class voting in Iceland, as classes with different levels of  economic resources diverge 
in their voting behavior, and a horizontal component to class politics, as classes which 
face different occupational task structures, differ in their authoritarian and libertarian 
views on society. Comparing the eight class schema that results from such a classifica-
tion to the conventional divide between manual and non-manual workers, suggests that 
divides within the old classes are no less important than between them. 
We propose, moreover, that the recent global financial crisis may have acted as a cata-
lyst in realigning Icelandic politics around this new class schema. The Great Recession, 
as it is commonly referred to, caused the collapse of  most major financial institutions in 
Iceland and led to sharp increases in unemployment and economic insecurity, as well as 
bringing about substantial cuts to government spending and increases in taxation (Ólafs-
son 2016). As the economic crisis developed, it led to a full blown political crisis, with 
trust in political parties and government plummeting, large scale street protests,  elec-
toral volatility greatly increased between elections, and the introduction of  several new 
parties into parliament (Ólafsson 2016; Bernburg 2016; Indriðason et al. 2017; Önnu-
dóttir et al. 2017). By putting socioeconomic issues squarely on the political agenda and 
causing substantial electoral volatility, we argue that the Great Recession should have the 
potential to transform the relationship between class and voting in Icelandic politics. As 
such, Iceland in the period after the Great Recession can be considered a “most-likely” 
case for increases in class voting (George & Bennett 2005)
We test the hypotheses put forward in the paper using survey data from the Icelandic 
National Election Study. We employ logistic and multinomial logistic regression to evalu-
ate models of  party choice, testing both the development of  traditional class voting with 
data from 1983 to 2016, as well as whether a new class schema has gained relevance in 
Icelandic politics, with data from 1999 to 2016. We summarize the strength of  class vot-
ing with a novel measure we call “Full-Kappa”, which is based on a measure developed 
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in the context of  economic voting (Duch & Stevenson 2008) and income-based voting 
(Helgason 2016). The measure is similar to the well-known Kappa measure (Manza, 
Hout, & Brooks 1995), although it goes beyond it in several ways, most importantly by 
using the covariate profiles of  all respondents to derive a measure of  cleavage strength, 
rather than using the covariate profile of  a single, hypothetical “modal” respondent. 
There are two primary findings we wish to highlight. First, we find support for the 
importance of  class voting based around a new class schema, which structures party 
choice in Iceland. Before the Great Recession the strength of  this new class voting was 
moderate, especially compared to the strength of  the traditional class cleavage in the 
1980s. Second, we find that after the Great Recession, the strength of  new class voting 
has increased substantially, with the Conservative Independence Party being the most 
polarizing party among classes, i.e. its support among occupational classes has diverged 
considerably (as opposed to being uniform among different classes). While the center-
left Social Democratic Alliance was the other primary polarizing party before the crisis, 
the newly formed Pirate Party took up that role in the 2016 elections. 
The paper innovates on prior research in several ways. Empirically, the paper updates 
and extends prior work on class voting in Iceland, evaluating its development before and 
after the Great Recession, as well as applying a more sophisticated measure of  cleav-
age strength than in prior research. Theoretically, we argue that economic crises can be 
particularly consequential for class voting, in that they can bring about intense political 
conflicts about the welfare state and economic insecurity, as well being catalysts for the 
establishment of  new political parties. Thus, economic crises should be especially likely 
to increase the strength of  class voting. Finally, methodologically, we extend a measure 
previously employed in a different context to the case of  class voting. The measure, 
which we refer to as “Full Kappa”, improves upon the well-known Kappa-index and has 
the potential to be employed as a generic measure of  cleavage strength.
1. Traditional class voting in historical context
Class and class politics played a critical role in the formation of  European party sys-
tems in the early 20th century (Lipset & Rokkan 1967). While the mechanism by which 
class affects political behavior is often unspecified, conventional accounts highlight the 
importance of  class identity, the structure of  the industrial economy, union density, 
and economic self-interest, in creating and sustaining a strong affinity between class 
position and vote choice throughout its golden era (Evans 2000). Lipset’s (Lipset 1960, 
1981, 220–224) claim that “in virtually every economically developed country the lower 
income groups vote mainly for parties of  the left” highlights the directional component 
of  this relationship, although the occupational distinction between manual and non-
manual workers is more commonly theorized to be the basis for traditional class voting 
(Evans 2017).
Much like in neighboring countries, the development of  the Icelandic party system 
was strongly affected by the class cleavage. From the 1930s up until the Great Reces-




The Great Recession and 
new class voting in Iceland
formed to represent the interests of  specific socioeconomic cleavages: The right-wing 
Independence Party (business owners), the Center-Rural Progressive Party (farmers), 
and two left-wing parties, the Social Democratic Alliance and the Left-Green Move-
ment, which trace their roots to two working class parties, the Social Democratic Party 
and the Communist Party (Harðarson 1995). Although these parties were commonly 
joined in parliament by short-lived fifth or even sixth parties from the 1970s onward, 
the Icelandic party system was overall a four-party system for most of  the 20th century, 
making it in some ways distinct from the other Nordic party systems, which have gener-
ally had more parties represented in parliament (Bengtsson, Hansen, Harðarson, Narud, 
& Oscarsson 2014). 
The demise of  the class cleavage in the politics of  advanced democracies in the latter 
half  of  the 20th century has been well documented (Franklin, Mackie, & Valen 1992; 
Evans 1999; Clark & Lipset 2001; Knutsen 2006; Manza & Brooks 2008). At the micro 
level, social classes have become more cross-cutting due to increased social mobility, af-
fluence, individualization, and education, which reduces the structuring impact of  class 
on political behavior (Evans 2017), while at the macro level, political parties have in-
creasingly converged on policy positions with respect to the class cleavage, which again 
reduces its salience in structuring vote choice (Evans & de Graaf  2013). As some have 
argued, the basis for such partisan convergence on class related issues could be attribut-
able to increasing globalization in recent decades, which has to some extent removed 
macroeconomic policymaking from the electoral arena (Streeck 2009; Häusermann & 
Kriesi 2015). In any case, whether driven by a micro-level bottom-up process, or a mac-
ro-level top-down process, the observable implications are the same – a declining influ-
ence of  class on voting behavior.
Existing research on the Icelandic case, suggests that class voting followed a similar 
pattern throughout the 20th century. Thus, based on survey data from 1983 of  paternal 
political behavior during respondents’ youth, Harðarson (1995) suggests that class vot-
ing may have been strong in the 1930s and 1940s, but that it grew considerably weaker 
in the 1950s and 1960s. Using the Alford-index (Alford 1964) and extending his analysis 
to the 2003 elections, Harðarson (1995, 2004), furthermore, shows that class voting in 
the 1980s was weak compared to the other Nordic countries and essentially irrelevant 
from the 1995 election onward. Bengtsson et al. (2014, 36) provide a similar conclusion 
with respect to the early 2000s, finding that Iceland stands out from the other Nordic 
countries as the least polarized party system in terms of  left-right distances between 
party voters.
2. The Great Recession and new class voting
while the traditional class cleavage may have lost its relevance in recent decades, it doesn’t 
imply that occupational class no longer structures political choice in a meaningful man-
ner. Occupations are, for example, important determinants of  income, future economic 
mobility, and employment insecurity, which have long been recognized as strongly af-
fecting political preferences and vote choice (Moene & Wallerstein 2001; Rehm 2009; 
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Helgason & Merola 2017). As such, one would expect a vertical dimension to the ef-
fects of  occupational class on political behavior, ranging from low-income workers with 
limited employment security and career opportunities to high-income workers with 
relatively safe jobs and well-defined opportunities for career progression (Evans 2000). 
This vertical dimension is well captured by the Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero (EGP) 
class schema (Erikson, Goldthorpe, & Portocarero 1979; Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992), 
which has to a large extent superseded the manual/non-manual class dichotomy in stud-
ies of  class voting (Evans 2017).
More recent studies have, however, also pointed to the existence of  a horizontal di-
mension to occupational class, in addition to the vertical dimension. While the vertical di-
mension is characterized by differences in organizational authority and marketable skills, 
the horizontal dimension is based on differences in occupational task structures (Kitschelt 
& Rehm 2014). The fundamental premise behind the horizontal dimension is that policy 
preferences and political behavior are powerfully affected by the work logic individuals 
employ in their occupation. In this view, there is not a unified “middle class” or a unified 
“working class”, but heterogeneity within each vertical class which is based around the 
work experiences of  individuals embedded in different occupational task structures.
While such task structures can be classified in several ways, Oesch (2006, 2008) use-
fully delineates four work logics which should have differing implications for political 
preferences and behavior: A technical work logic, an organizational work logic, an inter-
personal work logic, and an independent work logic. The defining difference between 
the work logics are the setting of  the work process, its relation to authority, and primary 
orientation. Thus, for example, individuals who deal with clear-cut command structures 
and object- or document-related tasks (e.g. managers or production workers), should 
hold a more authoritarian view of  society than individuals who primarily deal with in-
dividuals from one day to another in a none structured manner (e.g. social workers or 
nursing aides). By distinguishing these different work logics, we can begin to understand 
the heterogeneity often found in the political preferences and behavior of  the vertical 
classes: the middle class and the working class.1
Combining the vertical and horizontal dimensions of  occupations, Oesch’s class 
schema results in eight different occupational classes: The traditional bourgeoisie and 
small business owners (independent work logic, high/low skilled), technical profession-
als and production workers (technical work logic, high/low skilled), managers and clerks 
(organizational work logic, high/low skilled), and socio-cultural professionals and ser-
vice workers (interpersonal service work logic, high/low skilled). Importantly, these are 
not social classes in the traditional sense, which are mobilized around a collective iden-
tity, but rather groupings of  occupations which, due to their commonalities, share latent 
interests with respect to the political realm (Oesch 2006). Thus, while class awareness 
(e.g. Kelley & Evans 1995; Oddsson 2016) may contribute to increasing class voting, 
Oesch’s (and our) use of  the concept is more in line with what Kocka (1980, 104) refers 
to as an “economic class” – a group of  individuals who share latent interests due to their 
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We argue that the political importance of  such a new class schema should be found 
in the Icelandic case. Thus, rather than experiencing continuing class dealignment, 
whereby the structuring effects of  class on vote choice decreases secularly over time (e.g. 
Dalton & Wattenberg 2002), our argument is that while the structuring role of  the tra-
ditional class cleavage may have decreased, there has been a postindustrial realignment 
around this new class schema, whereby large parties continue to offer distinctive pro-
grammatic platforms which appeal to different classes (Kitschelt & Rehm 2015). This is 
by no means the conventional wisdom in studies of  Icelandic political behavior. Indeed, 
recent sophisticated contributions have argued that Icelandic voters have moved further 
into the Michigan funnel of  causality for vote choice (Campbell et al. 1960) suggesting 
that the importance of  structural cleavages has declined, with issue voting and election-
specific factors now playing a more important role in voting behavior (Önnudóttir et al. 
2017). The perceived irrelevance of  the economic cleavage to vote choice can further-
more be gauged in another recent top-level contribution, which doesn’t mention either 
“income” or “class” in their analysis of  vote choice in the 2013 Icelandic parliamentary 
election (Indriðason, Önnudóttir, Þórisdóttir, & Harðarson 2017). On the contrary, we 
argue for the importance of  such economic factors, centered on the new class schema, 
which leads to our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: A new class schema, based on a vertical dimension 
of  marketable skills and a horizontal dimension of  occupational task 
structure, shapes party choice in Icelandic politics.
The specific aspects of  the vertical and horizontal dimensions of  the class schema, lead 
to two hypothesized dimension based around occupational class (Oesch 2008). First, 
a vertical dimension based on differences in economic resources, which pits the hold-
ers of  organizational power (traditional bourgeoisie and managers) against the working 
class (production workers and service workers). Second, a horizontal dimension based 
on cultural differences, which pits high-skilled individuals working in an interpersonal 
setting (socio-cultural professionals) who hold a libertarian view of  society against those 
occupied in an object-oriented setting (production workers) who hold an authoritarian 
view of  society (Oesch 2008). 
As Oesch, we expect the first dimension to primarily affect the support of  conserva-
tive parties, and parties of  the traditional left, which in the Icelandic context should pri-
marily affect the Conservative Independence Party and the left-wing Left-Green Move-
ment and Social Democrats. The second dimension, however, should primarily affect 
support for parties which advocate economic and cultural openness, one the one hand, 
and parties which take a firm position against such openness, on the other hand, which 
in the Icelandic context should primarily pit together the left-wing Social Democrats and 
Liberal Bright Future and Reform Party against the more Conservative Independence 
Party and Center-Rural Progressive Party. This leads to the following hypotheses:
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Hypothesis 2a: There is an economic-based occupational dimension 
in Icelandic politics between the traditional bourgeoisie and managers, 
on the one hand, and service workers and production workers, on the 
other hand.
Hypothesis 2b: There is a cultural-based occupational dimension 
in Icelandic politics between socio-cultural professionals, on the one 
hand, and production workers, on the other hand.
Should we expect an economic crisis of  the magnitude of  the Great Recession and 
the ensuing political crisis to affect the strength of  occupationally-based voting? From 
a micro-level, bottom-up, perspective of  class voting, there is little reason to expect 
such a shift. Factors which have been used to explain the decline of  class voting from 
a bottom-up perspective, such as increasing social mobility, affluence, individualization, 
and education, generally operate on a gradual basis, over the long-term. However, if  we 
accept a macro-level, top-down, approach to class voting, where the actions of  political 
actors and the ideological range of  options they collectively present to voters play a pri-
mary role, an economic crisis of  the size of  the Great Recession can potentially realign 
voters on the basis of  class. 
There are two primary mechanisms by which an economic crisis can bring about 
such a realignment, both of  which operated in the Icelandic case following the Great 
Recession. First, economic crises commonly bring about the need for painful austerity 
measures, as government revenue falls and government spending increases. As Gritter-
sová, Indridason, Gregory, and Crespo (2016) highlight in a different context, how aus-
terity measures are structured inevitably bring about policy decisions framed along the 
socioeconomic dimension: Should the government cut spending, which often involves 
reducing welfare state generosity and cutting the wages of  public employees, or should 
it raise taxes, shifting the burden on those with higher incomes? To the extent that an 
incumbent government is forced to pursue such austerity measures, it is likely to increase 
the range of  ideological positions offered by competing parties in the following election, 
and, thus, allowing the class dimension to structure political choice to a larger extent.
Second, as argued by Hernández and Kriesi (2016) a major crisis, such as the Great 
Recession, may lead to a substantial change in the structure and equilibrium of  a party 
system in a given country. In the context of  the present argument, an economic crisis 
may facilitate the formation of  new political parties which implicitly mobilize voters on 
the basis of  their latent occupational interests. Thus, while traditional political parties 
might be unlikely to rebrand themselves abruptly with respect to given economic inter-
ests (e.g. due to their prior issue positions or track record while in office), new parties 
are not bound by such a past. To the extent that an economic crisis brings about the 
emergence of  new political parties, it is likely to accelerate the realignment of  the party 
system around new dimensions of  contention.
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effect on class voting (i.e. when the economy improves, partisan conflict over economic 
issues should decrease in importance) the latter mechanism suggests that a crisis, such as 
the Great Recession, may have more longer-term implications for class voting. The key 
aspect of  the argument is that party systems are generally stable with limited potential 
of  existing parties to rebrand themselves with respect to economic issues and limited 
opportunities for new parties representing distinct platforms to emerge onto the stage. 
A large economic crisis can act as a “critical juncture” for such a stable party system, 
increasing the possibility for new parties to emerge and, as such, potentially transform 
the dimensions of  political conflict between different political parties. As should be 
clear, this mechanism is thus not analogous to the cyclical nature of  economic voting 
(e.g. Duch & Stevenson 2008), but rather suggest a longer term structural change in the 
relationship between occupational class and vote choice.
We hypothesize that the overwhelming effect of  the 2008 economic crisis, com-
monly referred to as the starting point of  the Great Recession, on Icelandic society, 
served as such a realigning event. The crisis involved the failure of  several major finan-
cial institutions and is considered one of  the largest financial collapses in world history, 
in relation to the size of   the economy (Helgason, forthcoming). On the economic front, 
the crisis brought about increases in unemployment and economic insecurity, a massive 
devaluation of  the currency, and the introduction of  spending cuts and tax raises by 
the government (Ólafsson 2016). On the political front, the economic crisis generated 
a full blown political crisis, with trust in political parties and government plummeting, 
large scale street protests, and electoral volatility greatly increased between elections 
(Bernburg 2016; Indriðason et al. 2017; Önnudóttir et al. 2017). The vote share of  new 
parties in Iceland, furthermore, increased exponentially in the post-crisis years. Thus, 
newly formed parties gained 8% of  the vote in 2009, 25% in 2013, and a massive 38% 
in the 2016 election. Of  these new parties, four gained representation in parliament: The 
Citizens’ Movement in 2009, The Pirate Party in 2013 and 2016, Bright Future in 2013 
and 2016, and the Reform Party in 2016. The first two parties both emphasized radical 
democratic reforms and a rejection of  “politics as usual” in their electoral campaigns, 
while the latter two are advocates of  social and economic liberalism. Thus, although 
none of  the new parties have explicitly mobilized voters around a specific occupational 
dimension, their distinctive platforms, both vis-à-vis each other, but also with respect 
to the established parties, could tap into latent occupational interests in different ways.
Based on the size of  the economic crisis and the increasing support for newly formed 
parties, we hypothesize that the Great Recession brought about a realignment along the 
lines of  the new class schema in Iceland, increasing its importance in voting behavior. 
While such a realignment could take place in the immediate aftermath of  the crisis, there 
are reasons to expect that there might be some delay between the onset of  the crisis 
and its effect on the party system. This is both because austerity is not implemented im-
mediately following an economic crisis – 2009-2012 were the main austerity years in the 
Icelandic case – but also because the formation of  new parties around latent economic 
interests is unlikely to occur in a short period of  time. As such, we offer two hypotheses 
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for the effects of  the Great Recession on class voting in Iceland, albeit we find that latter 
hypothesis more plausible.
Hypothesis 3a: The Great Recession immediately led to stronger 
occupational class voting in Iceland. Class voting should, thus, be 
stronger from 2009 onward, than in the years prior to the crisis.
Hypothesis 3b: The Great Recession led to stronger occupational 
class voting in Iceland with delay. Class voting should, thus, be strong-
er from 2013 onward, than in the years prior to the crisis.
3. Data and methods
To test the abovementioned hypotheses, we use survey data from the Icelandic National 
Election Study (ICENES), which has been fielded after every parliamentary election in 
Iceland since 1983 (ICENES Database n.d.). The survey is based on a representative 
sample of  the voting-eligible population, with the sample size ranging from 1400 to 
2600 in each survey. Early on the response rate was around 70% but in later years it has 
declined somewhat and has been around 55% in the last couple of  elections.2 We pool 
data from all survey years with available data. Due to the specific nature of  our measure 
of  occupational class, we can only test the new class hypotheses using data from 1999 
onward.  The overall sample size is, thus, 5,203 respondents from six elections.
The dependent variable used in the analysis is the respondent‘s self-reported voting 
behavior in the preceding parliamentary election. Since we are interested in the relation-
ship between occupational class and vote choice, we exclude non-voters from the analy-
sis, and only include parties which have gained seats in parliament. We further classify 
vote choice based on the “party family” voted for in an election (Lane & Ersson 1999), 
an approach commonly used in studies of  cleavage strength (e.g. Brooks, Nieuwbeerta, 
& Manza 2006; de Graaf, Jansen, & Need 2013; Hobolt 2013). Classifying parties in 
families is done to ensure comparability over the entire time period, as well as allowing 
for the inclusion of  smaller parties. 
Given the dominance of  the “four-party model” in Iceland, each of  the four main 
parties in Icelandic politics forms a separate category. This includes the Left-Green 
Movement (a left-wing party, i. Vinstrihreyfingin – grænt framboð), the Social Democratic 
Alliance (a center-left party, i. Samfylkingin), the Progressive Party (a centric-rural party: 
historically, an agrarian party, i. Framsóknarflokkurinn), and the Independence party (a 
conservative party, i. Sjálfstæðisflokkurinn). Two additional categories are included to cap-
ture other parties which have gained seats in parliament during the period: Firstly, a 
liberal party category, which includes Bright Future (2013-16, i. Björt framtíð) and the 
Reform Party (2013-16, i. Viðreisn), and is characterized by economic and social liberal-
ism and pro-Europeanism. Secondly a category for other parties, which are not easily 
classified within the other party families. This includes the Liberal Party (1999-2007, i. 
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Party (2013-16, i. Píratar). The first party mostly emphasized changes to the Icelandic 
fisheries system (and wasn’t a consistent advocate of  social and economic liberalism, 
despite its name), while the latter two are characterized by a rejection of  mainstream 
parties and support for more direct democracy over representative democracy. 
The main independent variable in the analysis is occupational class. Classifying re-
spondents based on Oesch’s 8-fold class schema is, however, not straightforward, since 
the ICENES dataset does not consistently include a fine grained measure of  occupation 
(see Oesch 2006, 2008). In particular, while Oesch’s class scheme to a large part requires 
2 digit ISCO codes to correctly classify respondents into classes, the ICENES dataset 
only includes 1 digit codes for some of  the years from 1999. It is possible, however, to 
map class positions using the 1 digit ISCO-codes, along with several other variables, in-
cluding whether the respondent is self-employed, his/her education level, and public or 
private sector employment. While using such an approximation induces some measure-
ment error, out of  sample testing suggests it gives a satisfactory representation of  the 
underlying class schema.3
All models include controls for age, gender, urban/rural residence, and education 
(primary, secondary, or tertiary), as well as fixed effects for each election year. The con-
trol variables are included in the models to ensure that any relationship we find between 
class and vote choice are not due to these more fundamental factors, while at the same 
time not introducing post-treatment bias into the model (i.e. each variable could plausi-
bly cause variation in occupation, while occupation would hardly cause variation in any 
of  the control variables). 
When testing hypotheses on changes over time, we interact the class variables with 
the relevant measure of  time, as detailed below. While other factors, such as individual 
values, issue positions and evaluations of  parties and leaders surely matter for party 
choice, they are not included in the analysis, since they are unlikely to confound the 
relationship between our primary independent variable of  interest, class, and the out-
come of  interest, vote choice. Furthermore, since part of  the effect of  class on party 
choice might be mediated through such variables, including them in the statistical analy-
sis would unnecessarily bias the effect of  class downwards.
3.1 Methods
We test the hypotheses using multinomial logistic regression, with vote choice regressed 
on control variables and year fixed effects in the baseline specification.4 To evaluate 
whether the new class schema offers any explanatory power, we contrast a model with 
no class measure (model 1) with a model which includes dummy variables for each of  
the eight classes (model 2). To test whether the effects of  this new class measure chang-
es over time, we estimate three models with temporal interactions. First, we estimate a 
model (model 3) with all eight classes interacted with a dummy for the post economic 
collapse period (takes on the value of  1 for the years 2009, 2013, and 2016). Second, 
we estimate a model (model 4) with all eight classes interacted with a dummy for the 
post crisis period (takes on a value of  1 for the year 2013 and 2016). Lastly, we estimate 
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a model (model 5) which allows for unconstrained changes in the effects of  class over 
the different years included in the sample (8 classes each interacted with 6 election year 
dummies). 
Each of  the models are fairly complex (8 classes and 6 party families), with no single 
coefficient in each model corresponding to the hypotheses being tested. However, since 
the models are nested (model 5 being the most general, model 1 the most restrictive), we 
use a likelihood ratio test to evaluate which model fits the data best. Simply put, the null 
hypothesis of  the likelihood ratio test is that the restriction imposed by the more restric-
tive model of  two models is valid (i.e. the coefficient(s) being excluded from the model 
equal zero). Rejection of  the null hypothesis implies we should prefer the more general 
model over the more restrictive model. The test statistic generated by the test follows 
a chi-square distribution, with degrees of  freedom equal to the number of  restrictions 
imposed (Greene 2003).
3.2 Measuring cleavage strength
The likelihood ratio tests allow us to determine which models best fit the data and, thus, 
test the main hypotheses put forward in this paper. However, they do not give us any 
indication of  the magnitude or direction of  change in the effects of  class on vote choice. 
To allow for such an evaluation, one has to construct a cleavage voting indicator, which 
can summarize the overall effect of  class on voting. The relatively simple and straight-
forward Alford-index (Alford 1964) is, perhaps, the best known of  such measures of  
cleavage strength, although in later years more sophisticated measures have been devel-
oped, with the Kappa-index (Hout, Brooks, & Manza 1995) being the most widely used 
measure of  cleavage strength in class voting research in recent years (Knutsen 2013). 
In this paper, however, we use a measure based on a strategy developed by Duch 
and Stevenson (2008) and extended by Helgason (2016), which is similar in spirit to the 
Kappa-index, although it goes beyond it in several ways.5 Like the Kappa-index, the 
measure is based on the coefficients from the preferred model of  party choice, selected 
with the method outlined above. However, whereas the Kappa index uses a single hy-
pothetical “modal” individual to calculate differences in the predicted probabilities of  
different party choices associated with different classes, the method used here calculates 
the changes in predicted probabilities for the covariate profiles of  each and every mem-
ber of  the sample. This approach has the advantage of  giving a better representation of  
the underlying extent of  class voting, since the hypothetical “modal” individual does not 
necessarily give a good representation of  the underlying population (Train 2003). This is 
especially important in cases with many combinations of  values (e.g. with eight classes 
and six party choice outcomes in samples of  size 600-1000, the number of  observations 
within each combination are quite few), since such covariate profiles may lead to highly 
variable coefficient estimates, which may lead to volatile estimates of  cleavage strength.
The process of  compiling the measure is as follows: After estimating the preferred 
model of  party choice, we calculate the predicted probability of  each respondent vot-




The Great Recession and 
new class voting in Iceland
spondent (e.g. from production worker to manager) holding all other covariates fixed, 
recalculate the predicted probabilities, and find the change in predicted probabilities for 
voting for each party associated with a change in the class variable. We do this for each 
of  the occupational classes (e.g. for the new class variable, we simulate changes to seven 
different classes), each time generating a set of  values for changes in predicted prob-
abilities for each party. We then square the values (so that all values are positive), sum 
over each value separately for each year, and then standardize by dividing by the number 
of  changes in classes, number of  party choices, and number of  respondents. Finally, we 
take the square root of  the resulting value and multiply by 100. Due to similarities with 
the Kappa-index, we call this measure “Full Kappa”, as it calculates the Kappa-index 
based on all respondents in a sample, rather than merely a hypothetical “model” indi-
vidual. The equation for the yearly value of  the Full-Kappa measure is:
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The process of compiling the measure is as follows: After estimating the preferred 
model of party choice, we calculate the predicted probability of each respondent voting 
for each party choice. We then simulate a change in th  class variable for e ch 
respondent (e.g. from production worker to manager) holding all other covariates fixed, 
recalculate the predicted probabilities, and find the change in predicted probabilities for 
voting for each party associated with a change in the class variable. We do this for each 
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probabilities for each party. We hen square the values (so that all values are positive), 
sum over each value separately for each year, and then standardize by dividing by the 
number of changes in classes, number of party choices, and number of respondents. 
Finally, we take the square root of the resulting value and multiply by 100. Due to 
simil rities with the Kappa-index, we call this measure “Full Kappa”, as it calculates the 
Kappa-index based on all respondents in a sample, rather than merely a hypothetical 




where t stands for time, n for respondents (N for number of respondents), j for party 
choice (J for number of parties), and c for classes (C for number of classes). Finally, c* 
stands for the class an individual belongs to, with 
 
 
capturing the difference in predicted probability of a specific party choice, when class is 
changed to any other class than c*. 
Intuitively, the indicator captures the extent to which the predicted probabilities of 
each party choice is sensitive to changes in the class variable. In cases where the class 
variable is uncorrelated with party choice, changes in the predicted probabilities will be 
small and the resulting value for the indicator will be small. However, when class is 
highly predictive of vote choice, changes in the class variable will lead to substantial 
changes in the predicted probabilities and, consequently, a large Full-Kappa value. Like 
where t stands for time, n for respondents (N for number of  respondents), j for party 
choice (J for number of  parties), and c for classes (C for number of  classes). Finally, c* 
stands f r the class an individual belo gs t , with
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number of changes in classes, number of party choices, and number of respondents. 
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stands for the class an individual belongs to, with 
 
 
capturing the difference in predicted probability of a specific party choice, when class is 
changed to any other class than c*. 
Intuitively, the indicator captures the extent to which the predicted probabilities of 
each party choice is sensi ive to changes in the class variable. In cases where the class 
variable is uncorrelated with party choice, changes in the predicted probabilities wi l be 
sm ll and the resulting value for the indicator will be small. However, when class is 
highly pre ictive of vote choice, changes in the c ass vari ble will lead to substant al 
changes in the predicted probabilities and, consequently, a large Full-Kappa value. Like 
capturing the difference in predicted probability of  a specific party choic , 
changed to any other class than c*.
Intuitively, the indicator captures the extent to which the predicted probabilities of  
each party choice is sensitive to changes in the class variable. In cases where the class 
variable is uncorrelated with party choic , cha ges in t e predicted probabilities will 
be small and the resulting value for t e indicator will be small. However, when class 
is highly predictive of  vote choice, changes in the class variable will lead to substantial 
changes in the predicted probabilities and, consequently, a large Full-Kappa value. Like 
the Kappa-index, the Full Kappa measure can theoretically take on values from 0 (no 
differe c ) to 50 (full divergence).6
Like the Kappa-index, the Full-Kappa measure ca  be extended in several ways. In 
the analysis that follows, we take advantage of  this possibility by creating a party specific 
Full-Kappa measure, which captures the extent to which support for each party is polar-
ized based around occupational class, i.e. the extent to which a party’s support among 
occupational classes diverges (as opposed to being uniform among different classes). To 
do so, we follow the strategy above, but rather than summing over all voting outcomes, 
we sum over each voting outcome separately. 
Finally, to estimate the uncertainty of  the above measures, we bootstrap confidence 
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intervals around the mean predicted value (Carsey & Harden 2013). Thus, we draw 
a thousand samples of  observations from the data with replacement and repeat the 
process outlined above for each of  the samples.7 This gives us a thousand values for 
the yearly Full Kappa measure, which can be used to construct a confidence interval 
around the mean predicted value. Although constructing confidence intervals in this 
fashion is fairly conservative (i.e. we do not impose any normality constraint on the co-
efficients and are thus more likely to get wide intervals), this does give some indication 
for whether yearly fluctuations are within the margin of  error of  prior years or whether 
they are of  significance.
4. Analysis
As the models being estimated are fairly large, we focus on reporting summary statistics 
of  the models and graphical representation of  the results. The appendix includes full 
regression results for the preferred model. In the appendix, we also provide an analysis 
of  traditional class voting using the methodology outlined above. The results reaffirm 
prior research based on the Alford-index showing the increasing irrelevance of  tradi-
tional class voting in the Icelandic case (Harðarson 1995, 2004). 
However, is it the case that class no longer matters? Table 1 contrasts five models 
that test the hypotheses that there is a new class schema of  relevance in Icelandic politics 
and whether the Great Recession has caused a realignment around this new schema. A 
comparison of  models 1 and 2 allows us to evaluate the hypothesis that class matters for 
party choice, while a comparison of  models 3 and 4, with model 2 allows us to evaluate 
the hypothesis that the effect of  class changed following the Great Recession. Finally, 
comparing model 5 with model 4 shows whether unconstrained fluctuations over time 
(model 5) better characterize the development of  class voting over time than a single 
shift following the Great Recession (model 4).
We start by comparing models 1 and 2 which, respectively, include no measure of  
class and then Oesch’s 8 class schema. A likelihood ratio test suggests we should reject 
the hypothesis that class has no effect on party choice (p ≈ 0.00), which supports hy-
pothesis 1. Thus, we can say with confidence that there continues to be an occupational 
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Table 1. New Class Voting in Iceland, 1999-2016
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
8 class measure included? No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interacted with time? . No 2009-16 2013-16 Uncon-
strained
N 5203 5203 5203 5203 5203
Nagelkerke R2 0.284 0.301 0.307 0.308 0.326
LR-test vs. Model 1 (χ2 test stat.) 117.3* 161.3* 166.9* 293.1*
LR-test vs. Model 2 (χ2 test stat.) 44.0 49.6* 175.8
LR-test vs. Model 4 (χ2 test stat.) 126.2
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05 (P-values refer to the results of  the LR-test). Summary statistics from multinomial logistic regressions. 
DV: Party family voted for. Model includes year fixed effects and controls for, age, gender, urban/rural residence, and 
education.
Did the Great Recession alter the strength of  this cleavage? Models 3, 4, and 5 offer 
tests of  whether the effects of  class on voting behavior changes over time: Model 3 tests 
hypothesis 3a, which predicts that the effects of  class have changed in the post-collapse 
period (2009-16); model 4 tests hypothesis 3b, which predicts that the effects of  class 
have changed in the post-crisis period (2013-16); and model 5 tests whether trendless 
fluctuation has dominated. 
Comparing each of  the models to model 2, which assumes a constant effect for class, 
suggests a specific temporal pattern to class voting. We cannot reject the null hypothesis 
in the case of  model 3 (p = 0.12), while we can reject the null hypothesis of  no change 
in the case of  model 4 (p = 0.04). Thus, the data indicate that the effects of  class have 
changed significantly in the 2013 and 2016 elections from prior years, with the pattern 
in the 2009 election being more similar to the pre-collapse period than the post-collapse 
period. This is perhaps unsurprising, since the early crisis period offered little oppor-
tunity for parties to radically change their party platforms and realign voters along new 
lines. Finally, comparing model 4 and 5 suggests that trendless fluctuation does not fit 
the data better than a one-off  shift in the post-crisis period (p = 0.80). Overall, thus, 
model 4 is our preferred model, which supports hypothesis 3b, while counting as evi-
dence against hypothesis 3a.
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Figure 1. Traditional and New Class Voting in Iceland, 1983-2016 
Note: Both measures include 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals. Analysis for traditional class voting 
shown in appendix. 
 
Figure 1 shows the Full Kappa measure for new class voting based on model 4, with 
traditional class voting shown for comparison. Two things stand out from the figure. 
First, new class voting was relatively stable before the crisis, hovering around a low value 
of 6, which is similar to the extent of traditional class voting in 1999. Second, after the 
crisis, new class voting has increased substantially, first to a value of 7.5 in 2013 and then 
to a value of 9 in 2016. This is a substantial increase, shifting new class voting to a similar 
level as traditional class voting was between 1991 and 1995. Importantly, this suggests 
Figure 1. Traditional and new class voting in Iceland, 1983-2016
Note: Both measures include 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals. Analysis for traditional class voting shown in appendix.
Figure 1 shows the Full Kappa measure for new class voting based on model 4, with 
traditional class voting shown for comparison. Two things stand out from the figure. 
First, new class voting was relatively stable before the crisis, hovering around a low value 
of  6, which is similar to the extent of  traditional class voting in 1999. Second, after the 
crisis, new class voting has increased substantially, first to a value of  7.5 in 2013 and 
then to a value of  9 in 2016. This is a substantial increase, shifting new class voting to 
a similar level as traditional class voting was between 1991 and 1995. Importantly, this 
suggests that while new class voting remains less important than traditional class voting 
in earlier years, it still matters for voting behavior in Icelandic politics, and its impor-
tance has grown following the crisis. There is, thus, some indication that class politics in 
Iceland have shifted from a state of  dealignment to some realignment around the new 
class schema.
4.1 Partisan differences in class voting
Do all parties contribute to polarization around class or are there specific parties which 
mobilize voters, at least implicitly, around occupational class? Figure 2 attempts to shed 
light on this question by showing the development of  the party specific Full Kappa 
measure for the six different party families. The measure reflects the extent to which 
the predicted probabilities of  voting for particular party families changes as we simulate 
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that while new class voting remains less important than traditional class voting in earlier 
years, it still matters for voting behavior in Icelandic politics, and its importance has 
grown following the crisis. There is, thus, some indication that class politics in Iceland 
have shifted from a state of dealignment to some realignment around the new class 
schema. 
4.1 Partisan differences in Class Voting 
Do all parties contribute to polarization around class or are there specific parties which 
mobilize voters, at least implicitly, around occupational class? Figure 2 attempts to shed 
light on this question by showing the development of the party specific Full Kappa 
measure for the six different party families. The measure reflects the extent to which the 
predicted probabilities of voting for particular party families changes as we simulate 
changes to the class variable of respondents in the sample. Several factors in the figure 
warrant attention.  
 
 
Figure 2. Party-Specific New Class Voting, 1999-2016 Figure 2. Party-specific new class voting, 1999-2016
Note: All measures include 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals. Liberal Parties: Bright Future (2013-16) and the Reform 
Party (2016). Other Parties: The Liberal Party (1999-2007), the Citizens’ Movement (2009), and the Pirate Party (2013-16).
First, in the pre-crisis period class voting was strongest for the Social Democrats (Social 
Democratic Alliance) and Conservatives (Independence Party), with the Left Socialists 
(Left-Green Movement), Center-Rural (Progressive Party), and Others (Liberal Party) 
showing less intense forms of  class voting. This is, perhaps, unsurprising as the first two 
parties dominated Icelandic politics in the run-up to the 2008 crisis. After the crisis, a 
new pattern has emerged. As the popularity of  the Social Democrats has waned, so has 
their polarizing effect. This is to some extent driven by how the measure of  class voting 
is calculated, as, by definition, large parties have the potential to be more polarizing than 
small parties. The opposite is true of  the Conservative Independence Party, which were 
more polarizing in the 2016 election than in any other election in the period in ques-
tion, with the impact of  class going from moderate to strong from 2007 to 2016. The 
Pirate Party (only party under “Other Parties” in 2013 and 2016), similarly, has become 
substantially polarizing in class voting. The extent of  class voting for the Left Socialist 
Left Green Movement has increased slightly over the period in question, while the new 
class appeal of  the Center-Rural Progressive Party has fluctuated somewhat erratically. 
Finally, the newly formed liberal parties seem to contribute somewhat to the strength of  
class voting, especially in the 2016 election, when the impact of  class was considerable. 
Figures 3 and 4 show the occupational profiles of  parties in more detail for the 2007 
and 2016 elections, respectively, based on the results of  model 4. The figures show how 
much different from the sample mean the predicted probability of  voting for particular 
parties are for particular classes, with a black fill indicating statistical significance at the 
10% level. 
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Figure 3. Occupational Voting Profiles of Party Families in 2007 
Note: Black fill indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, based on bootstrapped confidence 
intervals. Percentage in each header shows vote share of each party family in the 2007 election. Other 
Parties: The Liberal Party. 
 
Starting with figure 3, small business owners (2nd bar from left in each subfigure) are 
clearly the most polarizing occupational class in 2007. They were about 9% less likely to 
vote for the Social Democrats than the sample mean, while being about 4% and 8% 
more likely to vote for the Center-Rural Progressive party and Conservative 
Independence Party, respectively. There is also a significant divergence in the voting 
behavior of production workers (4th bar from left), with the Social Democrats and 
Conservatives again being the polarizing parties. Thus, production workers were 6% 
more likely to vote for the former party and 7% less likely to vote for the latter party, 
than the average employed voter. A similar divergence presents itself when analyzing the 
voting behavior of socio-cultural professionals (7th bar from left), with the occupational 
group being 4% more likely to vote for the Social Democrats and 7% less likely to vote 
for the Conservatives, than average. Of the remaining occupational classes, only the 
support of managers (5th bar from left) for the Left Socialist Left Green Movement and 
the Conservative Independence Party stand out as significant, with managers being 5% 
Figure 3. Occupatio al voting profiles of party families in 2007
Note: Black fill indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, based on bootstrapped confidence intervals. Percentage in 
each header shows vote share of  each party family in the 2007 election. Other Parties: The Liberal Party.
Starting with figure 3, small business owners (2nd bar from left in each subfigure) are 
clearly the most polarizing occupational class in 2007. They were about 9% less likely 
to vote for the Social Democrats than the sample mean, while being about 4% and 8% 
more likely to vote for the Center-Rural Progressive party and Conservative Independ-
ence Party, respectively. There is also a significant divergence in the voting behavior of  
production workers (4th bar from left), with the Social Democrats and Conservatives 
again being the polarizing parties. Thus, production workers were 6% more likely to 
vote for the former party and 7% less likely to vote for the latter party, than the average 
employed voter. A similar divergence presents itself  when analyzing the voting behavior 
of  socio-cultural professionals (7th bar from left), with the occupational group being 4% 
more likely to vote for the Social Democrats and 7% less likely to vote for the Conserva-
tives, than average. Of  the remaining occupational classes, only the support of  manag-
ers (5th bar from left) for the Left Socialist Left Green Movement and the Conservative 
Independence Party stand out as significant, with managers being 5% less likely than 
average to vote for the former party and 8% more likely to vote for the latter party.
Overall, the occupational voting profiles in 2007 suggest two primary dimension 
of  contention. First, a somewhat strong economic dimension between managers and 
production workers, which manifest in differing levels of  support for the two left-wing 
parties on the one hand and for the Conservative Independence Party on the other 
hand. Second, there is a clear middle class split between socio-cultural professionals, on 
the one hand, and small business owners, on the other hand, which primarily manifests 
itself  in differences in support for the two largest parties, the Social Democrats and 
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around these two parties, with the Social Democrats forming a coalition of  production 
workers and socio-cultural professionals, and the Conservatives of  small business own-
ers and managers. As suggested by figure 2, other parties were much less polarizing in 
terms of  occupational class.
Figure 4 suggests that in 2016, nine years onwards from 2007, there is some con-
tinuity in the occupational voting profiles of  the different party families, but also that 
substantial changes have occurred on some cases. To begin with, the Conservatives 
are again the most polarizing party and seem to be even more polarizing than in the 
2007 elections, as suggested by figure 2. In 2016, three occupational classes diverge by 
over 10% from the sample mean in their voting behavior for the party: The traditional 
bourgeoisie (1st bar from left) were 12% more likely to vote for the party than the other 
classes, while socio-cultural professionals and service workers (8th bar from left) were 
12% and 11% less likely to vote for the party than average, respectively. 
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Figure 4. Occupational Voting Profiles of Party Families in 2016 
Note: Black fill indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, based on bootstrapped confidence 
intervals. Percentage in each header shows vote share of each party family in the 2016 election. Liberal 
Parties: Bright Future and the Reform Party. Other Parties: The Pirate Party. 
 
Interestingly, the latter two occupational classes diverge in whom they are more likely to 
vote for. While both classes eschew the Conservative Independence Party, socio-cultural 
professionals allocate their votes to a larger extent towards the Left-Green Movement 
(Left Socialists) and the newly formed Bright Future and Reform Party (Liberal Parties), 
while service workers overwhelmingly support the Pirate Party (Other Parties). 
Countering their strong support among service workers, the Pirate Party is opposed 
more by technical professionals (3rd bar from left) and managers, on average, than by the 
sample mean. The only other statistically significant difference is the support for small 
business owners for the Progressive Party (Center- Rural).  
Overall, the occupational voting profiles in 2016 suggest the existence of two 
dimensions of contention, albeit somewhat changed from 2007. First, a strong economic 
dimension between managers and the traditional bourgeoisie, on the one hand, and 
service workers, on the other hand. This is a change from 2007, with the primary 
difference being that production workers showed the opposite behavior to managers in 
Figure 4. Occupational voting profiles of party families in 2016
Note: Black fill indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, based on bootstrapped confidence intervals. Percentage in 
each header shows vote share of  each party family in the 2016 election. Liberal Parties: Bright Future and the Reform Party. 
Other Parties: The Pirate Party.
Interestingly, the latter two occupational classes diverge in whom they are more likely to 
vote for. While both classes eschew the Conservative Independence Party, socio-cultural 
professionals allocate their votes to a larger extent towards the Left-Green Movement 
(Left Socialists) and the newly formed Bright Future and Reform Party (Liberal Parties), 
while service workers overwhelmingly support the Pirate Party (Other Parties). Coun-
tering their strong support among service workers, the Pirate Party is opposed more by 
technical professionals (3rd bar from left) and managers, on average, than by the sample 
mean. The only other statistically significant difference is the support for small business 
owners for the Progressive Party (Center- Rural). 
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Overall, the occupational voting profiles in 2016 suggest the existence of  two di-
mensions of  contention, albeit somewhat changed from 2007. First, a strong economic 
dimension between managers and the traditional bourgeoisie, on the one hand, and 
service workers, on the other hand. This is a change from 2007, with the primary differ-
ence being that production workers showed the opposite behavior to managers in 2007, 
while service workers were more divergent in 2016. Second, and to a lesser extent, there 
continuous to be a middle class split between socio-cultural professionals and small 
business owners, with the former showing strong support for the Left Socialists and 
Liberal Parties, and the latter being more likely to support the Center-Rural Progressive 
Party and Conservatives.
Thus, the evidence for hypotheses 2a and 2b are mixed. Support for hypothesis 2a 
is somewhat strong. There is clearly an economically-based occupational cleavage in 
Icelandic politics, with the traditional bourgeoisie and managers opposing service work-
ers and/or production workers in their voting behavior. There is less support, however 
for hypothesis 2b. In 2007, both socio-cultural professionals and production workers 
showed similar voting behavior. In 2016, there are less similarities, but hardly enough 
difference to suggest that the two occupational classes vote in opposite directions. In-
stead, there seems to be a durable difference in the voting behavior of  socio-cultural 
professionals and small business owners. Overall, thus, we consider hypothesis 2a sup-
ported, while we reject hypothesis 2b.
5. Conclusion
The preceding analysis suggests that class is not irrelevant to Icelandic politics. While 
our findings support prior research on the decline of  traditional class voting, there clear-
ly exists a new class schema which affects party choice to some extent. Moreover, the 
strength of  this cleavage has increased following the Great Recession, with increasing 
divergence in the voting behavior of  occupational classes. Throughout the period under 
study, the Conservative Independence Party has been the most polarizing party in terms 
of  class, with its occupational voting profile becoming even more polarizing following 
the economic crisis. Newly formed parties also seem to have contributed to increasing 
class voting, with the Pirate Party showing similar levels of  class divergence in the 2016 
election as the Independence Party. Overall, this suggest that an individual’s occupa-
tional class is still relevant to party choice in Iceland and studies of  vote choice should 
account for an individual’s economic position in their analysis.
What are the implications of  these results for the future of  Icelandic politics? First, 
there are clear signs of  increasing class voting following the Great Recession with the 
data suggesting that the crisis may have contributed to realigning voters to with respect 
to class. This is not least so because the crisis facilitated the emergence of  new parties 
that have successfully tapped into the latent class interests of  different occupational 
groups. During the same time, the class profile of  the formerly dominant Independence 
Party has become much more homogenous, with the party now appealing strongly to 
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As Hernández and Kriesi (2016) suggest, there is reason to believe that such changes 
caused by the Great Recession can have longer-term implications – i.e. that the crisis 
to some extent exogenously “shocked” a stable party system, changing its composi-
tion drastically. Thus, the changes brought about by the Great Recession may well have 
caused a realignment, in which a durable, programmatic difference in interests between 
different occupational groups becomes manifest in the party system.
Such speculations are, however, necessarily tentative, not least since we are still mere-
ly a decade removed from the onset of  the crisis. Thus, it might be the case that the 
changes observed are temporary, perhaps being driven by the short-term salience of  
inequality and concerns for economic security, which may subside as time passes. The 
success of  newly formed parties may, furthermore, be ephemeral, with traditional par-
ties regaining ground in future elections. Only time will tell if  that is the case. 
A natural next step is to extent the present analysis with comparative data. The hy-
potheses presented on the effects of  the Great Recession on class voting suggests that 
we should observe increasing polarization along the lines of  class in countries hit hard 
by the crises and more so in countries with permissive electoral systems, with lower bar-
riers for new parties to gain seats in parliament. With the economic conflict following 
the recession providing the impetus and new parties the vehicle for mobilization around 
latent occupational interests, there is reason to believe that increases in class voting 
should not be isolated to the Icelandic case.  
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Notes
1 For a more detailed discussion of  the theoretical foundations of  the class schema, see Oesch (2006, 
2008) .
2 We have no reason to expect changes in the response rates to affect the evaluation of  the relation-
ship between vote choice and occupational class.
3 Part 3 of  the appendix shows how the original variables from the ICENES dataset were recoded 
into Oesch’s 8 class schema. To gauge how well this approximation captures the underlying class 
schema, we use the same method on Icelandic respondends from the 2012 European Social Survey 
(ESS, 2012). Since the 2012 ESS data contains all the necessary variables to faithfully create Oesch‘s 
8 class schema, we can compare how well the approximation does in classifying respondents in 
Iceland. Overall, approximately 80% of  respondents are correctly classified based on the method 
used here, which we expect to hold in the ICENES data as well. While such measurement error due 
to incomplete data is unfortunate, it should work against finding systematic relationships between 
variables in the following analysis, and, in any case, provide a lower bound to the effect of  class on 
voting. 
4 In the appendix, we provide an analysis of  the traditional class decline hypothesis using the same 
methodology.
5 Duch and Stevenson use the indicator to measure the effects of  the economy on vote choice, while 
Helgason uses it to measure the effects of  income on vote choice.
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6 A simplified example for illustrative purposes: Say there are two occupational classes, A and B, and 
three parties, X, Y and Z. To calculate the measure of  cleavage strength, we run a conventional mul-
tinomial logistic regression and calculate the change in predicted probabilities of  each vote choice 
X, Y and Z when we change the value of  the class variable from A to B (or vice versa). If  class has a 
large explanatory value for vote choice, the change in predicted probability of  voting for each party 
will be large for different classes. As an example, a switch from A to B might make one, on average, 
30% less likely to vote for X, 20% more likely to vote for Y and 10% more likely to vote for Z. 
However, if  class has a small explanatory value for vote choice, the change in predicted probabilities 
will only change slightly. As an example, a switch from A to B might make one, on average, 3% less 
likely to vote for X, 2% more likely to vote for Y and 1% more likely to vote for Z. This calculation 
is repeated for every covariate profile in the sample and summed over all occupational groups and 
all vote choice outcomes to arrive at the full Kappa measure. A large full Kappa measure will thus 
reflect large changes in predicted probabilities associated with a change in the class variable, while a 
small full Kappa measure will reflect the opposite.
7 We stratify each bootstrap sample by year and class, so that the sample size of  each class and each 
year remains identical in all draws.
References
Alford, R.R. (1964). Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies. London, UK: Rand McNally.
Bengtsson, Å., Hansen, K.M., Harðarson, Ó.Þ., Narud, H.M., and Oscarsson, H. (2014). The Nordic 
Voter: Myths of  Exceptionalism. Colchester, UK: ECPR Press.
Bernburg, J.G. (2016). Economic Crisis and Mass Protest: The Pots and Pans Revolution in Iceland. London, UK: 
Routledge.
Brooks, C., Nieuwbeerta, P., and Manza, J. (2006). “Cleavage-Based Voting Behavior in Cross-National 
Perspective: Evidence from Six Postwar Democracies”, Social Science Research 35(1), 88–128.
Campbell, A., Converse, P.E., Miller, W.E., and Stokes, D. (1960). The American Voter. New York, NY: 
John Wiley and Sons.
Carsey, T.M., and Harden, J.J. (2013). Monte Carlo Simulation and Resampling Methods for Social Science. Thou-
sand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Clark, T.N., and Lipset, S.M. (eds.) (2001). The Breakdown of  Class Politics: A Debate on Post-Industrial Strati-
fication. Washington, D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
Dalton, R.J., and Wattenberg, M.P. (eds.) (2000). Parties Without Partisans. New York, NY: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
de Graaf, N.D., Jansen, G., and Need, A. (2013). “The Political Evolution of  Class and Religion: An In-
terpretation for the Netherlands, 1971–2006”, in G. Evans and N.D. de Graaf  (eds.), Political Choice 
Matters: Explaining the Strength of  Class and Religious Cleavages in Cross-National Perspective (pp. 205–242). 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Duch, R.M., and Stevenson, R.T. (2008). The Economic Vote: How Political and Economic Institutions Condition 
Election Results. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Erikson, R., and Goldthorpe, J.H. (1992). The Constant Flux: A Study of  Class Mobility in Industrial Societies. 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Erikson, R., Goldthorpe, J.H., and Portocarero, L. (1979). “Intergenerational Class Mobility in Three 
Western European Societies: England, France and Sweden”, British Journal of  Sociology 30(4), 415–
441.
ESS (2012). European Social Survey Round 6 Data. Data file edition 2.3, Norwegian Social Science Data 
Services, Norway.
Evans, G. (1999). The end of  class politics?: class voting in comparative context. USA: Oxford University Press..





The Great Recession and 
new class voting in Iceland
Evans, G. (2017). “Social Class and Voting”, in K. Arzheimer, J. Evans, and M.S. Lewis-Beck (eds.), The 
SAGE Handbook of  Electoral Behaviour (pp. 177–198). London, UK: Sage Publications.
Evans, G., and de Graaf, N.D. (eds.) (2013). Political Choice Matters: Explaining the Strength of  Class and 
Religious Cleavages in Cross-National Perspective. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Franklin, M.N., Mackie, T.T., and Valen, H. (1992). Electoral Change: Responses to Evolving Social and Attitu-
dinal Structures in Western Countries. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
George, A.L., and Bennett, A. (2005). Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. MA: MIT 
Press.
Greene, W.H. (2003). Econometric Analysis (6th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Grittersová, J., Indridason, I.H., Gregory, C.C., and Crespo, R. (2016). “Austerity and niche parties: The 
electoral consequences of  fiscal reforms”, Electoral Studies 42, 276–289.
Harðarson, Ó.Þ. (1995). Parties and Voters in Iceland: A Study of  the 1983 and 1987 Althingi Elections. Reykja-
vik, Iceland: Social Science Research Institute.
Harðarson, Ó.Þ. (2004). “Kjósendur og stéttir á Íslandi 1983-2003 [Voters and Classes in Iceland 1983-
2003]”, in Ú. Hauksson (ed.), Rannsóknir í félagsvísindum VI (pp. 613–625). Reykjavík, Iceland: Há-
skóli Íslands.
Häusermann, S., and Kriesi, H. (2015). “What Do Voters Want? Dimensions and Configurations in 
Individual-Level Preferences and Party Choice”, in P. Beramendi, S. Häusermann, H. Kitschelt, 
and H. Kriesi (eds.), The Politics of  Advanced Capitalism (pp. 202-230). New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press.
Helgason, A.F. (forthcoming). “Government Responses to the Great Recession: A Comparative Per-
spective”, in S. Ólafsson, M. Daly, O. Kangas, and J. Palme (eds.), Welfare and the Great Recession: A 
Comparative Study. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Helgason, A.F. (2016). “Income-Based Voting and Polarization Over Redistribution Under Alternative 
Electoral Systems”, Electoral Studies 42, 22–32.
Helgason, A.F., and Merola, V. (2017). “Employment Insecurity, Incumbent Partisanship, and Voting 
Behavior in Comparative Perspective”, Comparative Political Studies 50(7), 1489–1523.
Hernández, E., and Kriesi, H. (2016). “The electoral consequences of  the financial and economic crisis 
in Europe”, European Journal of  Political Research 55(2), 203–224.
Hobolt, S.B. (2013). “Enduring Divisions and New Dimensions: Class Voting in Denmark”, in G. Evans 
and N.D. de Graaf  (eds.), Political Choice Matters: Explaining the Strength of  Class and Religious Cleavages 
in Cross-National Perspective (pp. 185–204). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Hout, M., Brooks, C., and Manza, J. (1995). “The Democratic Class Struggle in the United States, 1948-
1992”, American Sociological Review 60(6), 805–828.
ICENES Database (n.d.). Retrieved from http://fel.hi.is/icelandic_national_election_study_icenes
Indriðason, I.H., Önnudóttir, E.H., Þórisdóttir, H., and Harðarson, Ó.Þ. (2017). “Re-electing the Cul-
prits of  the Crisis? Elections in the Aftermath of  a Recession”, Scandinavian Political Studies 40(1), 
28–60.
Kelley, J., and Evans, M.D.R. (1995). “Class and Class Conflict in Six Western Nations”, American Socio-
logical Review 60(2), 157–78.
Kitschelt, H., and Rehm, P. (2014). “Occupations as a Site of  Political Preference Formation”, Compara-
tive Political Studies 47(12), 1670–1706.
Kitschelt, H., and Rehm, P. (2015). “Party Alignments. Change and Continuity”, in P. Beramendi, S. 
Häusermann, H. Kitschelt, and H. Kriesi (eds.), The Politics of  Advanced Capitalism (pp. 179-201). New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Knutsen, O. (2006). Class Voting in Western Europe: A Comparative Longitudinal Study. London, UK: Lex-
ington Books.
Knutsen, O. (2013). “Structural determinants of  party choice: The changing impact of  socio-structure 
variables on party choice in comparative perspective”, in W.C. Müller and H.M. Narud (eds.), Party 
Governance and Party Democracy (pp. 175–203). New York, NY: Springer-Verlag.
181Agnar Freyr Helgason STJÓRNMÁL
&
STJÓRNSÝSLA
Kocka, J. (1980) “The Study of  Social Mobility and the Formation of  the Working Class in the 19th 
Century”, Le Mouvement Social 111, 97–118.
Lane, J.E., and Ersson, S. (1999). Politics and Society in Western Europe (4th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications.
Lipset, S.M. (1981). Political Man: The Social Bases of  Politics (Original work published 1960). London, UK: 
Heinemann. 
Lipset, S.M., and Rokkan, S. (1967). Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives. New 
York, NY: Free Press.
Manza, J., and Brooks, C. (2008). “Class and Politics”, in A. Lareau and D. Conley (eds.), Social Class: How 
Does it Work? (pp. 201-31). New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.
Manza, J., Hout, M., and Brooks, C. (1995). “Class voting in capitalist democracies since World War II: 
dealignment, realignment, or trendless fluctuation?”, Annual Review of  Sociology 21, 137–162.
Moene, K.O., and Wallerstein, M. (2001). “Inequality, Social Insurance, and Redistribution”, American 
Political Science Review 95(4), 859–874.
Oddsson, G. (2016). “Neoliberal Globalization and Heightened Perceptions of  Class Division in Ice-
land”, The Sociological Quarterly 57, 462-490.
Oesch, D. (2006). Redrawing the Class Map. Stratification and Institutions in Britain, Germany, Sweden and Swit-
zerland. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
Oesch, D. (2008). “The Changing Shape of  Class Voting”, European Societies 10(3), 329–355.
Ólafsson, S. (2016). “The Strategy of  Redistribution: Iceland’s Way Out of  the Crisis”, in V. Ingimunda-
rson, P. Urfalino, and I. Erlingsdóttir (eds.), Iceland’s Financial Crisis: The Politics of  Blame, Protest, and 
Reconstruction (pp. 156-182). London, UK: Routledge.
Önnudóttir, E.H., Schmitt, H., and Harðarson, Ó.Þ. (2017). “Critical Election in the Wake of  an Eco-
nomic and Political Crisis: Realignment of  Icelandic Party Voters?”, Scandinavian Political Studies 
40(2), 157–181.
Rehm, P. (2009). “Risks and Redistribution: An Individual-Level Analysis”, Comparative Political Studies 
42(7), 855–881.
Streeck, W. (2009). Re-Forming Capitalism: Institutional Change in the German Political Economy. Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press.
Train, K. (2003). Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

IAgnar Freyr Helgason STJÓRNMÁL
&
STJÓRNSÝSLA
Appendix for “The Great Recession and New Class Voting in Iceland”
Part 1: Traditional Class Voting
The weaknesses of  the Alford-index are well known, which has led researchers to apply 
ever more sophisticated measures to the study of  class voting (Manza et al., 1995). Since 
such a measure has not been applied to the Icelandic case, we evaluate the decline of  
traditional class voting in the Icelandic case in the appendix. Based on the theoretical 
discussion in the main paper, as well as previous findings by Harðarson (2004), we ex-
pect a trend of  decline in traditional class voting in the Icelandic case. From the forma-
tion of  the modern Icelandic party system, particular parties explicitly mobilized voters 
on the basis of  class, with survey evidence suggesting high levels of  class voting around 
the middle of  the 20th century (Harðarson, 2004). Similarly, the mechanisms outlined 
in the paper leading to declining class voting have all been at work in the Icelandic case. 
To test the traditional decline hypothesis, we dichotomize party choice, coding re-
sponses into the two categories of  “Voted for left-wing party” and “Voted for non-left 
wing party”. Parties which were explicitly founded to represent the interests of  the 
working class, their successors, and minor split-off  parties, are classified as left-wing 
parties. This includes the Social Democratic Party and the People‘s Alliance from 1983 
to 1995, their successors, the Social Democratic Alliance and the Left-Green Movement 
from 1999 to 2016, and the split off  parties Alliance of  Social Democrats in 1983 and 
1987 and National Awakening in 1995.1 All other parties are classified as non-left wing 
parties.
In the evaluation of  the traditional decline hypothesis, occupational class is dichoto-
mized into manual workers and non-manual workers on the basis of  a corresponding 
variable included in the ICENES dataset.
We follow the same methodology as in the main paper to evaluate whether class 
voting has changed over time, with vote choice regressed on traditional class, control 
variables, and year fixed effects in the baseline specification (model A.1). We evaluate 
two additional models to test whether the effects of  class changes over time: First, we 
interact the class variable with a continuous measure of  time (model A.2). Secondly, we 
interact the class variable with a dummy variable for each of  the election years (model 
A.3). We continue comparing models of  increasing complexity using the likelihood ratio 
test.
1 The exclusion of the minor split-off parties as left-wing parties does not alter the results 
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Table A.1. Traditional Class Voting in Iceland, 1983-2016
Model A.1 Model A.2 Model A.3
2 class measure included? Yes Yes Yes
Interacted with time? No Linear Unconstrained
N 9061 9061 9061
Nagelkerke R2 0.055 0.059 0.060
LR-test vs. Model 1 (χ2 test stat.) 32.0* 34.7*
LR-test vs. Model 2 (χ2 test stat.) 2.7
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05. Logistic regression results. DV: Voted for Left party? Model includes year fixed effects and controls for, 
age, gender, urban/rural residence, and education. See Table A.2 for full results.
Has traditional class voting remained constant, declined linearly, or fluctuated with no 
apparent trend from 1983 onward? Table A.1 shows a comparison of  three models 
representing each of  these different scenarios: Model A.1 represents the case of  a “con-
stant effect”, model A.2 represents the case of  “traditional decline”, and model A.3 a 
case of  “trendless fluctuation”. Comparing the models using a likelihood ratio test, we 
find that model A.2 offers an improvement over model A.1 (p ≈ 0.00), while model A.3 
does not improve upon model A.2 (p = 0.95). Thus, the “traditional decline” model fits 
the data best, as suggested by previous research.
Figure A.1 shows the Full Kappa measure calculated on the basis of  model A.2. Class 
voting started out at the relatively large value of  16 in 1983 and has progressively be-
come smaller. From 2007 it has been statistically insignificant from 0 and in the 2013 
and 2016 elections, the measure is exactly 0, indicating that non-manual workers are now 
more likely to vote for left-wing parties than manual workers.2 
2 Note that since we are testing the traditional decline hypothesis, which indicates a speci-
fic direction in class voting (manual workers becoming relatively less likely to vote for 
left-wing parties), we do not allow for the possibility of non-manual workers being more 
likely to vote for left-wing parties, as seems to be the case. If we did allow for such a 
pattern, the Full Kappa indicator would show a slight increase in 2013 and 2016, which 
would not indicate a resourgence in traditional class voting, but the exact opposite. 
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Figure A.1.  Traditional Class Voting in Iceland, 1983-2016
Has traditional class voting remained constant, declined linearly, or fluctuated with no apparent trend 
from 1983 onward? Table A.1 shows a comparison of three models representing each of these different 
scenarios: Model A.1 represents the case of a “constant effect”, model A.2 represents the case of 
“traditional decline”, and model A.3 a case of “trendless fluctuation”. Comparing the models using a 
likelihood ratio test, we find that model A.2 offers an improvement over model A.1 (p ≈ 0.00), while 
model A.3 does not improve upon model A.2 (p = 0.95). Thus, the “traditional decline” model fits the 
data best, as suggested by previous research. 
 
Figure A.1 shows the Full Kappa measure calculated on the basis of model A.2. Class voting started 
out at the relatively large value of 16 in 1983 and has progressively become smaller. From 2007 it has 
been statistically insignificant from 0 and in the 2013 and 2016 elections, the measure is exactly 0, 
indicating that non-manual workers are now more likely to vote for left-wing parties than manual 
workers.2  
 
Figure A.1.  Traditional Class Voting in Iceland, 1983-2016 
 
Note: Full Kappa measure includes 90% bootstrapped confidence interval. 
For comparison, we include the Alford-index calculated by Harðarson (2004) and extended in 
Bengtsson et al. (2014). While the two indicators are not measured on the same scale, their trend is 
similar in its decline. Since the Alford-index is calculated separately for each election, it shows a more 
                                                 
2 Note that since we are testing the traditional decline hypothesis, which indicates a specific direction in class voting (manual 
workers becoming relatively less likely to vote for left-wing parties), we do not allow for the possibility of non-manual 
workers being more likely to vote for left-wing parties, as seems to be the case. If we did allow for such a pattern, the Full 
Kappa indicator would show a slight increase in 2013 and 2016, which would not indicate a resourgence in traditional class 
voting, but the exact opposite.  
Note: Full Kappa measure includes 90% bootstrapped confidence interval.
For comparison, we include the Alford-index calculated by Harðarson (2004) and ex-
tended in Bengtsson et al. (2014). While the two indicators are not measured on the same 
scale, their trend is similar in its decline. Since the Alford-index is calculated separately 
for each election, it shows a more volatile relationship than our preferred model. How-
ever, as model A.2 fits the data as well as model A.3 ( hich allows for unconstrained 
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Table A.2 Full Results from Table A.1
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Manual workers (Non-manual = ref.) 1.352* 2.046* 2.098*
(5.65) (7.87) (4.64)
Age 1.003* 1.003* 1.003*
(2.05) (2.00) (1.97)
Female? 1.515* 1.480* 1.480*
(8.53) (8.01) (8.01)
Rural residence? 0.876* 0.884* 0.884*
(-2.81) (-2.60) (-2.60)
Education (Secondary = ref.):
  - Primary education 0.961 0.960 0.961
(-0.74) (-0.75) (-0.72)
  - Tertiary education 1.603* 1.543* 1.546*
(7.22) (6.60) (6.63)
Linear change (year centered on 1983):
- Manual X Year (Cont.) 0.972*
(-5.61)
Unconstrained change (1983 = ref.):
- Manual x 1987 0.923
(-0.39)
- Manual x 1991 0.808
(-0.99)
- Manual x 1995 0.620*
(-2.31)
- Manual x 1999 0.616*
(-2.32)
- Manual x 2003 0.513*
(-3.09)
- Manual x 2007 0.467*
(-3.52)
- Manual x 2009 0.537*
(-2.72)
- Manual x 2013 0.401*
(-3.77)
- Manual x 2016 0.461*
(-2.54)
Intercept 0.444* 0.359* 0.354*
(-8.84) (-10.18) (-8.38)
2 class measure included? Yes Yes Yes
Interacted with time? No Linear Unconstrained
N 9061 9061 9061
AIC 11363 11333 11347
Nagelkerke R2 0.055 0.059 0.060
LR-test vs. Model 1 (Chi 2 test stat.) 32.0* 34.7*
LR-test vs. Model 2 (Chi 2 test stat.) 2.7
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05. Logistic regression results. DV: Voted for Left party? Exponentiated coefficients. t-stat. in parentheses. 
Model includes year fixed effects (not shown). 
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Part 2 Full Results from the Preferred Model 4 in Table 1 in Main Paper  
Table A.3
Left Soc. Soc. Dem. Other Liberals Agrarians
Social Class (Managers = ref.):
  - Traditional bourgeoisie 0.220 0.260 1.082* -0.0574 -0.568
(0.48) (0.87) (2.05) (-0.00) (-1.00)
  - Small business owners 0.275 -0.239 0.240 0.359 0.287
(1.00) (-1.21) (0.67) (0.00) (1.31)
  - Technical Professionals 0.898* 0.386+ 0.702+ 0.285 0.439
(2.92) (1.65) (1.66) (0.00) (1.53)
  - Production Workers 0.768* 0.711* 0.798* 0.654 0.354
(2.90) (3.87) (2.35) (0.00) (1.63)
  - Clerks 0.234 0.203 0.240 0.0383 -0.113
(0.80) (1.00) (0.60) (0.00) (-0.44)
  - Socio-cultural professionals 0.911* 0.654* 0.731* 0.292 0.402+
(3.51) (3.60) (2.01) (0.00) (1.70)
  - Service workers 0.529* 0.425* 0.349 0.255 -0.0397
(2.00) (2.31) (0.98) (0.00) (-0.18)
Social class X Year Dummy (1999-2009 = ref.)
  - Trad. bourg. x 2013-16 -0.910 -0.259 -2.106* -0.879 0.151
(-1.44) (-0.48) (-2.86) (-0.00) (0.21)
  - Small bus. x 2013-16 -0.317 0.539 -1.399* -0.771 -0.255
(-0.86) (1.32) (-3.07) (-0.00) (-0.78)
  - Tech. x 2013-16 -1.121* -0.593 -2.498* -0.381 -0.608
(-2.46) (-1.15) (-3.45) (-0.00) (-1.42)
  - Prod. work. x 2013-16 -0.655+ -0.467 -1.183* -0.419 -0.281
(-1.83) (-1.13) (-3.11) (-0.00) (-0.89)
  - Clerks x 2013-16 -0.319 0.347 -0.663 -0.277 -0.413
(-0.77) (0.83) (-1.34) (-0.00) (-0.98)
  - Soc. cult. x 2013-16 -0.280 0.118 -0.748+ 0.247 -0.441
(-0.88) (0.34) (-1.87) (0.00) (-1.30)
Age 0.00183 0.0109* -0.00382 -0.00472 0.00139
(0.57) (4.21) (-0.95) (-0.76) (0.48)
Female? 0.672* 0.549* -0.316* 0.288 0.129
(6.55) (6.41) (-2.32) (1.62) (1.34)
Rural residence? 0.357* 0.0183 -0.140 -0.796* 1.112*
(3.69) (0.22) (-1.11) (-3.95) (12.37)
Education (Secondary = ref.):
  - Primary education 0.134 0.102 0.0333 0.0885 0.208*
(1.10) (1.02) (0.23) (0.35) (2.02)
  - Tertiary education 0.260+ 0.375* -0.539* 0.150 -0.240+
(1.94) (3.29) (-2.91) (0.65) (-1.76)
Intercept -1.146* -2.564* 0.253 -0.165 -1.648*
(-3.16) (-6.74) (0.58) (-0.00) (-4.68)
8 class measure included? Yes




+ p<0.10, * p<0.05. DV: Party family voted for (columns represent different outcomes). Reference category: Conservatives. 
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Part 3 Occupational Class Measure
The following table shows how the occupational class measure is derived from original 
variables in the ICENES dataset measuring occupation (variable isco1d, 1-digit ISCO 
codes3, based on variable mainjobflo10 in ICENES), self-employment (variable selfemployed, 
dummy coding4, based on variable uniwindw in ICENES), education (variable educ4, 4 
ordered categories5, variable education4 in ICENES), and public employment (variable 
public, dummy coding6, based on variables govpriv_m and govpriv_pub in ICENES). Note 
that because the ICENES dataset does not include a more fine grained measure of  oc-
cupation, the following is only an approximation to Oesch’s (2006, 2008) class schema. 
However, out of  sample testing suggests that this approximation has acceptable validity, 
as discussed in the main text of  the article.
8-Class schema constructed
1 Self-employed professionals and large employers
 Respondents with selfemployed=1 AND educ4=4 AND (isco1d=1 OR isco1d=2)
2 Small business owners
 Respondents with selfemployed=1 AND NOT (educ4=4 AND (isco1d=1 OR isco1d=2))
3 Technical (semi-)professionals
 Respondents with isco1d=3 AND selfemployed=0 AND (educ4=3 OR educ4=4)
 Respondents with isco1d=3 AND selfemployed=0 AND public=0
4 Production workers
 Respondents with (isco1d=6 OR isco1d=7 OR isco1d=8) AND selfemployed=0
 Respondents with isco1d=9 AND selfemployed=0 AND public=0
5 (Associate) managers
 Respondents with isco1d=1 AND selfemployed=0
6 Clerks
 Respondents with isco1d=4 AND selfemployed=0
7 Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals
 Respondents with isco1d=2 AND selfemployed=0
 Respondents with isco1d=3 AND selfemployed=0 AND public=1 AND educ4=2
8 Service workers
 Respondents with isco1d=5 AND selfemployed=0
 Respondents with isco1d=9 AND selfemployed=0 AND public=1
 Respondents with isco1d=3 AND educ4=1 AND selfemployed=0 and public=1
3 Values: 1 = Managers, 2 = Prefessionals, 3=Technicians and Associate Professionals, 
4=Clerical Support Workers, 5=Services and Sales Workers, 6=Skilled Agricultural, For-
estry, and Fishery Workers, 7=Craft and Related Trades Workers, 8=Plant and Machine 
Operators, and Assemblers, 9=Elementary Occupations
4 Values: 1= Is self-employed, 0= Is not self employed
5 Values: 1= Primary Education, 2= Secondary Education, 3=Vocational Education, 4= Terti-
ary Education
6 Values: 1= Is a public employee, 0= Is not a public employee
